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Alberico Gentili’s De iure belli: An absolutist’s attempt to reconcile the jus gentium 
and the reason of state tradition  
Abstract: Based on a detailed analysis of Gentili’s use of sources in De iure belli, this article 
argues that Gentili’s famous treatise on the laws of war is an incongruous attempt at reconciling 
an absolutist conception of sovereignty and a strong penchant for reason of state principles with 
an enduring commitment to the language of natural law and to its centrality in ordering relations 
between sovereigns.   
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Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in the writings of Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), 
particularly his works on war,1 and a surge in debates over how to interpret the sixteenth century 
Italian émigré’s ideas. Ever since Richard Tuck identified Gentili with a humanist tradition 
deeply opposed to the ideas of the scholastics in The Rights of War and Peace, Gentili’s writings 
on the laws of war, and especially his masterpiece on the subject, De iure belli (DIB), have been 
scrutinized in order to determine where exactly Gentili stood amidst the conflicting ideologies 
and modes of thinking of his time. In addition, various claims have been put forward to explain 
the specificity of DIB, both in the specialized literature on early modern legal debates and within 
																																																						
1 The most notable contributions include Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, eds., The Roman 
Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Alberico Gentili, The Wars of the Romans: A Critical Edition and Translation of De Armis Romanis, ed. 
Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann, trans. David A. Lupher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); and 
Alberico Gentili, Il diritto di guerra (de iure belli libri III, 1598), trans. P. Nencini, ed. G Marchetto and C. Zendri, 
with an introduction by D. Quaglioni (Milano: AGiuffrè, 2008). 
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broader histories of international law and of the laws of war. This new surge of interest comes 
amidst a long tradition of treating Gentili’s DIB as a pivotal text in the history of international 
law, notably for its ‘secular’ underpinnings and for its ‘modern’ conception of the laws of war.2    
The purpose of this article is to clarify some of these disagreements by closely examining 
Gentili’s use of sources in DIB. More specifically, through this focus on sources, the article 
seeks to resituate Gentili’s DIB beyond the immediate legal debates that have conventionally 
framed its analysis, and to place the text within the broader political thought of the period. 
Gentili’s text, the article claims, is particularly noteworthy in its attempt to straddle the legal and 
political debates of its epoch, looking beyond legal sources and turning to various contemporary 
political writers in what was quite a remarkable move at the time. His attempt to bridge what has 
been identified within international political thought as the two broad ‘languages’ of the 
period—the legal and the political—is an aspect of his work that has not been sufficiently 
examined, despite its potential for shedding a new light on the dynamics that underpinned the 
development of international law at the time.3 
																																																						
2 This is particularly obvious in the main textbooks on the history of international law (Grewe, Schmitt, Nussbaum). 
Gentili’s modernity in his approach to the law of war, particularly when compared with Grotius, has also been 
emphasized in the more specialized literature, including by Haggenmacher, who notes that DIB ‘often seems closer, 
if not to the 1899/1907 Hague Rules of Land Warfare, at least to the spirit of eighteenth-century warfare as reflected 
by authors like Moser or Vattel,
 
than is the Grotian system, however elaborate, coherent, and profound it may be,’ 
though he does point to the inherent anachronism involved in this type of assessment. Peter Haggenmacher, “Grotius 
and Gentili: A Reassessment of Thomas E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture”, in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and 
Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 168 and 
173.   
3 In presupposing a distinction between the two, I am speaking exclusively here of the debates concerning inter-
sovereign relations. At the inter-sovereign level, the initial separation between, on the one hand, a ‘political’ 
language centered around the concepts of ‘reason of state’ and the ‘balance of power’, and, on the other hand, the 
‘legal or jurisprudential’ language centered on old notions of ‘natural law’ and ‘law of nations’ now repackaged to 
conceptualize the ‘rights’ of sovereigns and people has been outlined particularly sharply by Keene (Edward Keene, 
International Political Thought: A Historical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 98-133). The broader 
claim about the existence of different ‘languages’ of early modern international political thought is drawn from 
Pagden (Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987)). A convincing case can be made for why the boundaries between these areas 
was much more porous at the domestic level (see for instance Kelly, John M., A Short History of Western Legal 
Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), xvi).        
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This is not to say, of course, that no attention has been paid to the more political aspects 
of DIB, and to its affinity, as a legal text, with certain strands of political thought. Much of the 
current debate about whether DIB—and Gentili more broadly—should be placed within the 
humanist category, can in a way be understood as a disagreement over Gentili’s political 
leanings. Yet, humanism was only one facet of the political thought of the period, and its age-old 
premises were being increasingly overshadowed by the rise of new modes of political thinking—
particularly the concept of raison d’état—that eventually came to characterize the emerging era. 
This article pays closer attention to the latter, emphasizing DIB’s surprising and generally 
underappreciated affinities with these ideas.4 It builds upon existing works that highlight Bodin’s 
momentous influence on Gentili, and expands this analysis by taking stock of Gentili’s equally 
striking reliance on writers from the emerging reason of state tradition, thus articulating Gentili’s 
use of Bodin through his broader engagement with the burgeoning intellectual currents of his 
time. In doing so, the article pushes back against the ‘(standard) argument’ that ‘international law 
arose with modern statehood as a position and a craft that was opposed to the raison d’état.’5 If 
Gentili’s famous treatise on the law of war is by any means an indicator of how international law 
initially developed, raison d’état certainly needs to be placed back at the heart of how we study 
the history of international law.   
Having set out the context within which Gentili’s use of sources can be interpreted, I 
outline the most striking influences on his text, and explain why these are key to understanding 
what was so particular about the Italian jurist’s famous treatise on the laws of war at the time. 
																																																						
4 It is worth noting that in his seminal work on Grotius and his forerunners, Haggenmacher mentions Bodin and his 
influence only briefly, he cites Machiavelli just once (to note a ‘curious coincidence’ between his thinking and that 
of Grotius regarding what the sovereign is entitled to do with his or her state, n. 898), and he never mentions 
Guicciardini. Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Genève: Graduate Institute 
Publications, 1983).   
5 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Raison D’état: Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law’, in The 
Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 298. 
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Ultimately, I argue that one of the most important reasons why Gentili’s DIB stood out was that 
it was the work of an absolutist who tried to base a theory of the laws of war on what was at the 
time a groundbreaking and controversial conception of sovereignty. In doing so, Gentili’s 
primary concern was to reconcile Bodin’s concept of sovereignty, the teaching of the reason of 
state writers, and his own commitment to ensuring law would continue to matter in regulating 
external relations between sovereign polities. Gentili's absolutism, i.e. his commitment to a 
radical understanding of sovereignty that granted almost unlimited powers to the ruler, has of 
course been a hotly debated matter, not least because Gentili's stance evolved over the course of 
his career, and because branding him an absolutist was a very convenient way for Catholic critics 
to undermine the Protestant jurist's work when it was forcefully revived in the nineteenth 
century.6 DIB, in particular, is not as stark in its absolutist claims as some of Gentili's later 
writings, nor as systematically coherent in its positions, thus leaving some room for debate. I 
address these points explicitly in the second part of the article. 
To this purpose, I first outline some elements of clarification for how we may understand 
Gentili’s work and particularly his De iure belli, highlighting some of the major debates 
concerning Gentili’s writings. Second, I point to the well-established influence of Bodin on 
Gentili, particularly in terms of his absolutist conception of sovereignty, but conclude that while 
Gentili fully embraced Bodin’s absolutist position, he had to look elsewhere in order to adapt 
Bodin’s ideas to relations between early modern states. Third, I examine the reason of state 
writers to which Gentili turned in attempting to develop a framework for inter-sovereign 
relations. Fourth and finally, I argue that the main challenge Gentili faced was adapting the ideas 
of these writers, who saw little use for law in facilitating and stabilizing external relations 
																																																						
6 See, for instance, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, ‘Quelques mots sur les hommages projetés à la mémoire de Grotius 
et d'Albéric Gentil, et sur les dernières publications y relatives’, Revue de droit international et de législation 
comparée, tome VIII (1875), 694.    
 5 
between early modern states, to his commitment to placing law at the center of this endeavor. In 
other words, Gentili took what was then the fairly counter-intuitive step of trying to incorporate 
the increasingly popular concepts of raison d’état and balance of power into a legal framework 
for inter-sovereign relations.  
Before I begin, a bibliographical note: De iure belli libri tres was first published in 1598, 
as an expanded version of Gentili’s earlier lectures De iure belli commentationes tres (1588/89). 
A few reeditions then appeared, in 1604, 1612, 1770, and in 1877 during the nineteenth century 
revival of Gentili’s work. Finally, in 1933 the treatise was reedited in what is now the most 
commonly used edition, which contains both a photographic reproduction of the 1612 edition 
and an English translation of the original Latin. In the analysis that follows, I have referred to 
this 1933 edition, which allows one to consult the 1612 text in parallel with its English 
translation. Importantly, the marginalia in the 1933 English translation mirrors exactly that of the 
1612 Latin original, and the marginalia of the 1612 version is identical to that of the original 
1598 edition.7  
 
I. Reading Gentili’s DIB: some elements of clarification   
For all the celebrations of Gentili as a great founder of international law, there is a certain 
amount of confusion and mystery that shrouds his work. Often his positions across his different 
publications seem inconsistent, making it difficult to understand where he stood and how exactly 
his different writings relate to each other. Three main reasons for this confusion stand out: first, 
while Gentili spent his first Oxonian decade (1581-1590) teaching and writing the treatises that 
																																																						
7 I have verified this by comparing the 1612 photographic reproduction to John Selden’s copy of the 1598 original, 
which is available at the Bodleain Library under the filing number 8°G.6.Jur.Seld.    
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established him as a leading jurist of his day,8 the later part of his career (1590-1608) was more 
fully dedicated to practice and consequently, he wrote numerous opinions that depended 
primarily on his clients’ interests and thus often contradicted each other. Second, Gentili evolved 
significantly during his career, from a staunch Bartolist following his training in Perugia to what 
Randall Lesaffer has termed a ‘moderate humanist’ over the course of his time in England, 
embracing ‘a via media between Bartolism and humanism’.9 Third, and relatedly, the term 
‘humanism’ has come to encompass a number of meanings, and in the longstanding debate over 
whether or not Gentili was indeed a humanist, it is not always clear whether the humanism in 
question is of a civic, rhetorical, or legal kind. In this section, I will thus outline four crucial 
elements for situating the work of Gentili—specifically his DIB—and navigating this somewhat 
muddled contextual landscape.  
First of all, Gentili wrote at a time of nothing short of a methodological revolution in 
international law and history,10 pitting the traditional ideas of Bartolists (the ‘mos italicus’) 
against the sensational innovations of the initially Bourges-based legal humanists (the ‘mos 
gallicus’),11 and his position within that debate evolved significant throughout his career. The 
																																																						
8 In the words of K. R. Simmonds, ‘there can be little doubt that at his death in 1608 much of his reputation as a 
scholar and publicist rested upon the work of his earlier career in Oxford’. K. R. Simmonds, ‘The Gentili 
Manuscripts’, Zeitschrift Der Savigny-Stiftung Für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 76, no. 1 (1959): 
546. 
9 For brief statements, see Alain Wijffels, ‘From Perugia to Oxford: Past and Present of Political Paradigms’, in 
Alberico Gentili: La Traduzione Giuridica Perugina E La Fondazione Del Diritto Internazionale, ed. Ferdinando 
Treggiari (Perugia: Università degli Studi di Perugia, 2008), 59–61; Randall Lesaffer, ‘Alberico Gentili’s Ius Post 
Bellum and Early Modern Peace Treaties’, in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, ed. Benedict 
Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 216; Simmonds, ‘The Gentili 
Manuscripts’ 1959 (n. 10), 546–549. For longer analyses, see Giovanni Minnucci, Alberico Gentili tra mos italicus e 
mos gallicus: l’inedito commentario ad legem Juliam de adulteriis, Archivio per la storia del diritto medioevale e 
moderno ; 6 (Bologna: Monduzzi Editore, 2002); Giovanni Minnucci, ‘Per Una Rilettura Del Metodo Gentiliano’, in 
Alberico Gentili: La Traduzione Giuridica Perugina E La Fondazione Del Diritto Internazionale, ed. Ferdinando 
Treggiari (Perugia: Università degli Studi di Perugia, 2008). 
10 Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Sixteenth-Century Revolution in the Methodology of Law and History 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). 
11 Though as Haggenmacher notes, the relationship of the mos gallicus to the mos italicus should be characterized as 
an effort to broaden and transform rather than as a move towards clear rupture and a complete rejection of tradition. 
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debate was essentially one over how best to understand, interpret, and use Roman law, the vast 
majority of which was compiled in what became known as the Corpus iuris civilis. Throughout 
the Middle Ages, the assumption of the Bartolists (mos italicus) had been that the Corpus iuris 
was a perfect system of jurisprudence, and the resulting approach had been to focus on exegesis 
of the Roman Law and to creatively adapt Roman concepts to the medieval world. The scholastic 
method, on which this was based, entailed virtually pure logical analysis with very little 
historical perspective. The French legal humanists (mos gallicus) started out seeking to improve 
Roman jurisprudence by restoring its original meaning, which sometimes had been lost through 
misinterpretation, erroneous translations, or copying errors. Their initial endeavor, however, 
developed into a full-blown critique of Roman law when they realized that their attempt to 
discover the unifying logical underpinnings of the Corpus iuris was bound to fail because these 
were in fact, they concluded, inexistent. Roman law, they explained, was riddled with 
inconsistencies and logical incoherence, and, perhaps even more importantly, it was based on 
concepts that were developed in the particular historical context of Rome and that were 
sometimes completely at odds with the realities of their own world.  
As a result, these legal humanists advocated taking a much more critical stance towards 
Roman law and particularly towards the writings of great medieval authorities on the matter 
(such as Bartolus and Baldus), as well as looking beyond Roman law to create a better system of 
jurisprudence. This led to a renewed focus on domestic legal custom, but even more importantly, 
it led to a crucial turn towards the use of ‘universal history’ in the reconstruction of a juristic 
science.12 In other words, legal humanists—and particularly Jean Bodin on this specific matter—
hoped to remedy the deficiencies in the Roman legal system by turning to universal history. 
																																																																																																																																																																														
In his writings on war, Alciatus, one of the most famous proponents of the mos gallicus, is clearly indebted to both 
the humanists and to the Bartolists. Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (n. 4), 47-48.  
12 Ibid. 
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Bodin puts it most clearly himself in République: the sole way to build a truly universal juristic 
science, he explained, was to compare ‘all the laws of all, or the most famous, states, and to 
select the best variety’.13 The legal humanists thus turned their attention away from the medieval 
commentators and towards a vast web of sources, with a particular emphasis on the work of 
historians.    
Gentili was trained at Perugia as a Bartolist of the purest kind, and when he first arrived 
in Oxford, his first publication was a famous attack on legal humanism, De iuris interpretibus 
(1582), which categorically condemned the arguments of the great three—Budaeus, Alciatus, 
Zasius—and their followers. In the following two years, he published another attack on legal 
humanism: his polemical collection of letters and lectures entitled Lectionum et epistolarum quae 
ad ius civile pertinent (1583-4). However, by the time he wrote the first draft of DIB for his 1589 
lectures on the laws of war, he had gradually moved away from this complete rejection of the 
mos gallicus and, while he remained faithful to his Bartolist training, he clearly embraced many 
of the tropes of legal humanism, most notably in his use of sources.14  Indeed, in addition to 
citing the Corpus iuris civilis and the numerous commentaries on it—particularly those of 
Baldus—Gentili relies extensively on classical philosophers and rhetoricians (especially Cicero), 
classical historians (especially Livy), classical poets (especially Virgil),15 and contemporary 
historians (such as Paolo Giovio and Paolo Emilio). More tellingly still, he cites Alciatus, one of 
the foremost legal humanists, whom he calls a ‘great jurist’,16 231 times in DIB, second only to 
the main Bartolist authority, Baldus, whom he cites 315 times, and the Corpus iuris itself, which 
																																																						
13 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), xvi. 
14 A helpful summary of the different ways in which the influence of humanism can be felt in Gentili’s work can be 
found in Lesaffer, ‘Alberico Gentili’s Ius Post Bellum and Early Modern Peace Treaties’ 2010 (n. 11), 218.  
15 For a detailed discussion of Gentili’s reliance on poetry, see Christopher Warren, ‘Gentili, the Poets, and the Laws 
of War’, in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. Benedict 
Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 146–62. 
16 Ibid., 149. Gentili also calls him ‘the wise Alciati’ (DIB, Book I, §17).  
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he cites 465 times.17 Furthermore, while Gentili does regularly cite the Bible (with an 
overwhelming preference for the Old Testament), it is, with 193 citations, an important source 
but by no means as central as in the work of his more traditional predecessors. Similarly, he only 
cites Church Fathers (Tertullian, St Ambrose, St Jerome, St Bernard) between twenty and thirty 
times each, a rather low ratio compared to the wealth of other sources that are cited more 
frequently (see Figure 1). Thus, while Gentili ultimately never fully adopted the skepticism of 
the mos gallicus towards the Corpus iuris civilis and its medieval interpreters, the influence of 
legal humanism can strongly be felt in DIB and clearly had a strong impact on the way Gentili 
developed his positions. As such, the Gentili of the late 1580s and the 1590s is best understood 
as a ‘moderate humanist’ in the legal sense, with one foot still squarely within the Bartolist 
tradition and the other increasingly anchored within the mos gallicus and the challenges raised by 
legal humanism.     
Secondly, while a number of scholars have questioned the idea of a definite cleavage 
between Gentili and the School of Salamanca (particularly Vitoria),18 is it also far from clear that 
Gentili’s main interlocutors in DIB are in fact the theologians. The now conventional emphasis 
																																																						
17 There is also clear evidence that over his time at Oxford he became friends with Hugo Donellus and François 
Hotman (both dedicated supporter of Cujas), the latter whom he cites twenty-five times. In fact, Gentili cites Cujas 
himself thirty times in DIB. On the presence of evidence in the Bodleian manuscripts of Gentili’s friendship with 
Donellus and Hotman, see Simmonds, ‘The Gentili Manuscripts’ 1959 (n.10), 548. 
18 In the words of Blane and Kingsbury, ‘[a]ll three were Christian believers who were engaged in theological 
debates; Vitoria was a professional theologian influenced by jurists; Gentili and Grotius were theologically-informed 
jurists’. Alexis Blane and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Punishment and the Ius Post Bellum’, in The Roman Foundations of 
the Law of Nations, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
246–7. For an insightful account of the similarities between Gentili and the Salamancans on the subject of the 
treatment of the Ottomans, see Noel Malcolm, ‘Alberico Gentili and the Ottomans’, in The Roman Foundations of 
the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 127–45. More broadly, Lesaffer and Pagden question Tuck’s classic 
divide between humanists (which in Tuck’s account, supported by Diego Panizza, include Gentili) and scholastics, 
with Padgen arguing that ‘the more one examines the humanist/scholastic or humanist/theologian distinction, the 
more fuzzy it becomes. Anthony Pagden, ‘Gentili, Vitoria, and the Fabrication of a "Natural Law of Nations"’, in 
The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 345; Randall Lesaffer, ‘The Classical Law of Nations (1500-1800)’, in Research Handbook 
on the Theory and History of International Law, by Alexander Orakhelashvili, Research Handbooks in International 
Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 424–430. 
 10 
on the humanist/scholastic distinction presupposes that if, as Richard Tuck and Diego Panizza 
argue, Gentili was indeed a humanist, his main opponents and interlocutors were the theologians 
of the Second Scholastic, and particularly those of the School of Salamanca. However, the 
diversity within forms of humanism suggests that different debates may have been at stake, and 
that Gentili’s ‘humanist’ affinities did not necessarily make engaging the Salamancans his 
primary interest. In terms of citations, Gentili only cites Covarruvius19 (or Covarrubias) twenty-
two times, Vitoria seven times, and Soto four times (there is no mention of Molina). By contrast, 
he cites political writers—who had little interest in arguing with the theologians—such as the 
Italian historian and statesman Francesco Guicciardini and the French jurist and political 
philosopher Jean Bodin sixty-three and thirty-nine times respectively. In fact, the influence of 
Bodin on Gentili and the considerable weight Gentili gave to Bodin and his arguments in DIB 
are well-documented,20 and I will return to this important point later on in the article. For now, 
this mainly hints towards the fact that Gentili’s main motivation in writing DIB may not have 
been to undermine the arguments of the theologians—who were nonetheless his political rivals—
as much as to address the ideas of the French politiques and the Italian ragion di stato writers, 
who both emphasized the utmost importance of the well-being of the state and were stirring up 
considerable debates at the time.  
As this discussion suggests, the methodological debates that surrounded Gentili make his 
use of citations deeply revealing. Summing up and expanding on this analysis, the chart below 
																																																						
19 Corravubias was a canon lawyer rather than a theologian, but he was deeply influenced by the School of 
Salamanca.  
20 Diego Quaglioni, ‘The Italian ‘Readers’ of Bodin, 17th-18th Centuries: The Italian ‘Readers’ out of Italy--
Alberico Gentili (1552-1608)’, in The Reception of Bodin, ed. Howell A. Lloyd (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 371–86; 
Diego Quaglioni, ‘Pour une histoire du droit de guerre au début de l’âge moderne. Bodin, Gentili, Grotius’, trans. 
Jean-Louis Fournel, Laboratoire italien. Politique et société, no. 10 (December 31, 2010); Peter Schröder, ‘Vitoria, 
Gentili, Bodin: Sovereignty and the Law of Nations’, in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations, ed. 
Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 163–86; Wijffels, ‘From 
Perugia to Oxford’ 2008 (n. 11).  
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gives an overview of the main sources cited by Gentili in DIB, dividing them into broad 
categories based on their nature. It is worth noting that unlike Grotius, Gentili does not appear to 
follow a systematic pattern in citing different sources. For instance, while Grotius tends to cite 
religious authorities on each point, before moving on to non-religious ones—surely an effective 
way to satisfy different audiences—Gentili’s citations simply seem to follow the trajectory of his 
argument, with what he considers the most relevant authors cited in support of particular points, 
regardless of their affiliation. Ultimately, although this quantitative collection of data presents 
certain limits in terms of establishing how Gentili actually engaged with the different sources he 
invokes, Figure 1 provides an overview of Gentili’s universe of citations and constitutes a first 
set of insights for assessing the impact of various types of sources on Gentili’s thought in DIB. I 
provide a more in depth analysis of his use of certain key sources, particularly Bodin and 
Guicciardini, later on in the article.21  
What becomes clear from these charts is that in addition to the sources one would expect 
to find in the writings of a civil lawyer of this period, educated within the Bartolist tradition and 
influenced by both rhetorical and legal humanists—namely, the Corpus iuris and various 
commentaries on it from both legal traditions (Baldus, Alciatus…), scriptural sources (Bible, 
Church Fathers, canon law, theologians), classical philosophers and rhetoricians (Cicero, 
Plutarch, Aristotle…)—one key aspect of Gentili’s universe of citations stand out as particularly 
unusual. I am speaking here of his considerable reliance on historians from all ages, and most 
notably—an uncommon feat at the time amongst jurists—on contemporary historians. Indeed, 
Gentili relies significantly on classical historians (Livy, Plutarch’s biographies, Tacitus, 
Cassius…) and on other antique historians, especially Jewish and Byzantine ones (Josephus, 
																																																						
21 This type of two-tier quantitative/qualitative approach is not entirely uncommon, see for example Haggenmacher, 
“Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment” (n. 2), 146-147.  
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Procopius, Zonaras), but also on a range of modern historians, particularly historians of Italy, 
most importantly Paolo Giovo, Francesco Guicciardini, and Paolo Emilio. Additionally, Bodin, 
who had died just two years before the publication of De iure belli, is one of Gentili’s 
contemporaries who gets the most citations, and as I will explain at greater length in part II, he is 
in fact discussed extensively throughout the text and has been established as a major influence on 
DIB through an analysis of Gentili’s manuscripts. Moreover, in light of the present discussion on 
the use of different types of sources, it is worth mentioning that there is indeed a close 
connection between Gentili’s methodological turn to history and his heavy reliance on his French 
contemporary, a point to which I will return later.   
 
Figure 1: Gentili’s main sources, by type 
Rank Source Number of citations 
1 Corpus iuris civilis  465 
2 Baldus (MI) 315 
3 Alciatus (MG) 231 
4 Cicero 200 
5 Bible 193 
6 Livy 154 
7 Plutarch 117 
8 Cephalus  (MI) 104 
9 Alexander (MI) 102 
10 Augustine  75 
11 Decio (MI) 75 
12 Corpus iuris canonici 68 
13 Aristotle 66 
14 Plutarch (biographies) 66 
15 Paolo Giovo 65 
16 Guicciardini 63 
17 Seneca 60 
18 Tacitus 54 
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19 Cassius  48 
20 Decianus (MI) 48 
21 Pontanus (MI) 48 
22 Plato 40 
23 Josephus (Jewish) 39 
24 Paolo Emilio 39 
25 Bodin 39 
26 Philo Judaeus 37 
27 Virgil (Roman) 37 
28 Procopius (Byzantine) 37 
29 Zonaras (Byzantine) 37 
30 Jason Maynus (MI) 37 
Table 1: Gentili’s main sources, by overall citation ranking 
 
Thirdly, although DIB was published in full in 1598, the fact that Gentili wrote most of 
the content of DIB at the end of his scholarly period suggests that the positions he defends within 
DIB stem from a genuine attempt at developing a system of law rather than the sort of interest-
based positions found in works such as Hispanicae advocationis, the collection of opinions he 
wrote while (controversially) defending the Spanish Crown in the final part of his career. His 
other main work on war, De armis Romanis (DAR), although the second part was only published 
in 1599 (after his scholarly period), was also written around the same time, with the first part 
published in 1590 and the full draft ready by 1593. While the interpretation of this second work, 
and particularly its relationship to DIB, is notoriously arduous, it is clear that Gentili spent a 
significant amount of his scholarly period reflecting on the laws of war from an academic 
standpoint, prior to dedicating himself to practice and writing on some of these matters 
(particularly piracy and privateering) as an advocate in Admiralty Courts. One should thus 
appreciate the qualitative difference between what Gentili was attempting to do in writing DIB 
(and DAR) and in later on defending what have been pointed out as contradictory positions 
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within the context of his career as a lawyer. Importantly, this does not, however, mean that one 
should discount all of Gentili’s later writings as unreliable or written for exclusively instrumental 
purposes. Gentili did still write some pieces as a scholar rather than as a practitioner (such as his 
Regales disputationes tres of 1605), and his work as a lawyer still offers important insights into 
his thinking. The main point is that while his arguments as an advocate on, most notably, piracy 
and privateering, sometimes contradict each other (depending on who his client is) and are 
sometimes at odds with his earlier claims in DIB, these inconsistencies are not necessarily 
surprising and should be understood in the context of his dual professional identity.  
  Finally, one of the most important characteristics of Gentili to keep in mind in analyzing 
DIB is that he is a Roman law expert, or what the English called a ‘Civilian’. This feature 
followed from his training in Italy, and was further accentuated when he took up the position of 
Regius Professor of Civil Law at the University of Oxford in 1587. International22 lawyers were 
logically Roman law experts, as Roman law provided numerous rules for dealing with 
international or proto-international issues within the Roman empire, whereas common law was 
based on the assumption that it applied solely within a domestic context, there being no higher 
authorities than the domestic ones. Yet, being a civilian in a common law country was a rather 
peculiar situation, and in fact the Regius Chair had only been founded in the 1540s, along with a 
similar one at Cambridge. In a common law system, Roman law experts were only relevant 
within two specific types of courts that applied Roman-based civil law, namely ecclesiastical 
courts and admiralty courts. The latter in particular were a very important space for international 
jurists like Gentili, as they dealt directly with international issues, particularly with issues of 
prize and booty at the heart of which stood perennial questions about how to distinguish pirates 
																																																						
22 Throughout the article, I use the term ‘international’ as a heuristic device to speak of the realm pertaining to 
relations between independent sovereign polities. At the time, these relations were obviously ‘inter-sovereign’ rather 
than ‘international’ in the modern sense.   
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from privateers. For all other matters, the common law ruled, and there was a deep cleavage 
between common lawyers and their civilian rivals, who were indeed deeply unpopular. In fact, 
sometime in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century, civil lawyers had come to form a 
separate society of their own, called the Doctors’ Commons or College of Civilians, where its 
members could live, work, consult the library, and follow proceedings of the civil law courts. 
Gentili thus held a peculiar position as Oxford’s Regius Professor of Civil Law, and his work 
could easily have generated suspicion from his contemporaries working within the common law 
tradition, as we will see later on with regard to his support of James I. Importantly, it may also go 
some way into explaining why Gentili’s work lost much of its clout after his death only to be 
properly revived two and a half centuries later.    
  Ultimately, Gentili’s near-veneration of Roman law was uncommon even for a Civilian. 
His great admiration for Rome led him not only to give pride of place to Roman law in DIB, but 
in fact to equate Roman law with the jus gentium, and to construct the latter as the content of 
natural law itself.23 For Gentili, Roman law constituted the content of both the jus gentium (at the 
time, roughly interpreted as what we would call the ‘positivist’ law of nations, though in the 
twentieth century it has been equated with the specific law of individuals, e.g. human rights) and 
the jus naturale (natural law), making the jus gentium not only universal but also immutable. 
Roman law, in the eyes of Gentili, constituted the finest and final achievement of mankind, and 
provided an eternal legal framework for all. This position was notably different from that of the 
Romans themselves (and from that of his later rival, Grotius).24 Indeed, the Romans considered 
the jus gentium to be the law regulating the relationships between Romans and non-Romans; 
they did not construe it as a universal law in the same way as the early modern jurists, and 
																																																						
23 Pagden, ‘Gentili, Vitoria, and the Fabrication of a "Natural Law of Nations"’ 2010 (n. 20). 
24 Though it would later be taken up by Giambattista Vico with his concept of the ‘natural law of nations’.  
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especially not as Gentili did. In addition to being a Roman law expert, Gentili was thus quite 
unusual in his conception of Roman law, and it is essential to keep in mind the centrality which 
Gentili gave it in his system of law in order to understand the particularity of DIB. Most 
importantly, Roman law generally presupposes an emperor, a supreme authority whose doings 
nobody can judge.25 This underpinned what is perhaps Gentili’s most crucial characteristic, to 
which I next turn: his absolutism.  
 
II. Conceptualizing sovereignty: the influence of Bodin 
Gentili expressed his strikingly strong absolutism most famously in 1605, in the first disputation 
of his Regales disputations tres, entitled De potestate regis absoluta and dedicated to the new 
Stuart King, James I. In fact, Gentili’s three disputations of 1605 have sometimes been called 
‘the most absolutistic piece of writing that appeared in England in the early seventeenth 
century’,26 and Gentili himself ‘the theoretical founder of absolutism in England’.27 Gentili’s 
absolutism made him stand out as a jurist (particularly in England) and is, I will argue, a 
fundamental element to understand the specificity of his theory of the laws of war. Gentili’s 
absolutism stemmed from a combination of his admiration of Roman law with the profound 
																																																						
25 Although it is worth noting that the Roman tradition also had a Republican phase, and that medieval glossators 
and commentators had managed to interpret Roman law as to justify a complex web of overlapping sovereignties 
that was far removed from any sort of absolutist system.  
26 Brian Levack, ‘Law and Ideology: The Civil Law and Theories of Absolutism in Elizabethan and Jacobean 
England’, in The Historical Renaissance: New Essays on Tudor and Stuart Literature and Culture, ed. Heather 
Dubrow and Richard Strier (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 229. 
27 Brian P. Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603-1641: A Political Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 
98. In making this argument, Levack is following Gesina Van der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of 
International Law, second edition (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968),  330-1. However, almost no one, apart from John 
Cowell (1554-1611)—Gentili’s counterpart as the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge—‘picked up on 
Gentili’s work until it was used to reveal the real kernel of royalist belief in an anonymous parliamentary tract of 
1644’. Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven ; London: Yale University 
Press, 1996), 78. For a detailed analysis of the tract, entitled ‘Englands Monarchy, or A Conviction and Refutation 
by the Common law of those False Principles and Insinuating Flatteries of Albericus’, see Andrew Sharp, ‘Alberico 
Gentili’s Obscure Resurrection as a Royalist in 1644’, in Alberico Gentili: L’ordine Internazionale in Un Mondo a 
Più Civiltà: Atti Del Convegno Decima Giornata Gentiliana (San Ginesio: Milano: Giuffrè, 2002). 
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influence that Bodin’s theory of sovereignty had on him. Yet, Bodin’s theory raised as many 
problems for Gentili as it provided solutions, and Gentili had to search elsewhere to address 
these issues. In this section, I give an overview of the importance of Bodin’s ideas for Gentili 
before turning, in part III, to the writers he drew from in constructing a system of laws geared 
towards the interaction of independent sovereign polities.  
While the French Bodin28 was not an absolutist from the start, as apparent in his 
Methodus of 1566 (which Gentili does not cite in DIB), by the time he wrote the Six livres de la 
République in 1576 (‘République’), he had—almost unintentionally—come to adopt the 
absolutist position he would remain famous for.29 That being said, it is well-established that what 
Gentili took away from Bodin’s work was an uncompromising embrace of the staunchest 
absolutism. His position—and the influence of Bodin on this point—is at its clearest in his 
aforementioned 1605 tract on the Absolute Power of the King (De postesta regis absoluta), in 
which Gentili defends the absolutist theory that the Stuart King James I—who was likely to have 
been influenced by Bodin himself30—had put forward in 1598, shortly before his accession to the 
																																																						
28 Jean Bodin was a French jurist who wrote in the context of a tentatively constitutionalist France, operating based 
on a notion of limited supremacy. Two of his major works (the third being the later De la démonomanie des 
sorciers, which addresses a different set of questions), the Methodus of 1566 and the République of 1576, are 
conventionally seen as marking a remarkable shift in his thinking, with the République shedding the constitutionalist 
orientation of the Methodus and systematically developing a theory of royal absolutism. This shift is commonly 
associated with the St Bartholomew Day Massacre of 1572, which dramatically polarized French opinion and led 
Bodin, frightened by the rise of a revolutionary movement based on theories of legitimate resistance, to develop his 
unprecedented positions.      
29 Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory (Cambridge: University Press, 1973), 102. 
Although there is now an ongoing debate about the extent to which Bodin actually had an absolutist conception of 
sovereignty at all, even in the République. For a brief overview of the literature, see Daniel Lee, Popular 
Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 161, note 12. Lee 
himself is quite radical in his approach and considers that Franklin erred in his interpretation, confusing popular 
sovereignty with popular resistance, and he seeks to ‘dismantle the interpretive orthodoxy that Bodin was 
fundamentally hostile to popular sovereignty’. On the contrary, Lee claims, ‘Bodin deserves to be properly 
recognized as perhaps the most important systematic early modern theorist of popular sovereignty’ and a profound 
influence on Locke, Rousseau, and Sieyès (Ibid., 163.) 
30 Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 2013 (n. 22), 373. 
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throne (1603), in The Trew Law of Free Monarchies.31 In order to support his position, Gentili 
cites Bodin even more frequently than Baldus (or Bartolus) as the most relevant authority on the 
matter of sovereignty,32 and combines Bodin’s new theory with the Roman law principles of 
Princeps legibus solutus est (‘the sovereign is not bound by the laws’) and Quod Principi 
placuit, legis habet vigorem (‘what pleases the prince has the strength of law’).33 Gentili makes 
his reliance on Roman law explicit: ‘The civil law says that the princeps is unbound by the laws 
and that law is whatever pleases the princeps. This law is not foreign, but Roman: It is indeed the 
most excellent [praestantissima] among the laws of men’.34 Importantly, Gentili argued that 
these Roman law principles were directly applicable to the situation in England,35 and 
specifically, in an influential move within the English context, ‘that “absolute” authority was not 
an exclusively Roman notion, restricted only to those nations recognizing the civil law, but a 
universal one to be found in all independent states, including even in England’.36    
 
																																																						
31 Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Raison D’état’ 2010 (n. 5), 303. On Gentili’s defence of absolutist 
principles, see also Alain Wijffels, ‘Assolutismo Politico E Diritto Di Resistenza: La Disputatio Gentiliana "De vi 
civium in Regem semper iniusta"’ (Alberico Gentili: L’usa della forza nel diritto internazionale. Atti Del Convegno 
Undicesima Giornata Gentiliana, San Ginesio, 18-19 Settembre 2004). 
32 Schröder, ‘Vitoria, Gentili, Bodin: Sovereignty and the Law of Nations’ 2010 (n. 22), 170. 
33 Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Raison D’état’ 2010 (n. 5), 303. 
34 Gentili, Regales Disputationes, 9. Translation from Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional 
Thought 2016 (n. 31), 278.  
35 Benjamin Straumann, ‘The Corpus Iuris as a Source of Law Between Sovereigns in Alberico Gentili’s Thought’, 
in The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, ed. Benedict 
Kingsbury and Benjamin Straumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 101–25.  
36 Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought 2016 (n. 31), 278–9. As Daniel Lee explains in 
his chapter on ‘Roman Law in Early Modern England’, Gentili was ‘among the first civilians to present a civilian 
account of how English royal authority was absolute—that is legibus solutus’ and that his reasoning followed Bodin, 
thereby ensuring that ‘civil law spoke with the voice of Bodin in England’ (280, citing John Cowell, ‘Prerogative of 
the King’, The Interpreter, or, Booke Containing the Signification of Words (Cambridge, 1607), no page numbers). 
On the impact of civil lawyers in bringing absolutist political theory—primarily through the thought of Bodin—into 
England, see also Burgess’s chapter on ‘Civil Law, Sovereignty, and Absolutism, in Burgess, Absolute Monarchy 
and the Stuart Constitution 1996 (n. 29). Importantly, Burgess emphasizes that not all English civilians who are 
thought to have been Bodin-influenced absolutists were actually so (contesting the cases of Merbury, Forset, and 
Hayward), and that ‘the clearest example of civil-law absolutism is to be found in the thought of… Alberico 
Gentili’, an ‘exotic figure’ within this context considering his Italian Protestant background (75). It is in the work of 
Gentili, more so than in any of his English contemporaries, that we have ‘a conception of “absolute” authority that, 
on the one hand, was linked to Bodinian theories of sovereignty, and, on the other, intimated a raising of the 
conception of absolute power into a transcendent authority over the law’ (77).  
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As I have noted earlier based on Figure 1 and Table 1, the influence of Bodin is also very 
deeply felt in DIB. While it is true that Bodin is not necessarily at the very top of the citation 
chart, he stands out for being extensively discussed in the text itself whenever he is mentioned. 
As Diego Quaglioni, drawing heavily on the earlier work of Alain Wijffels,37 explains: ‘the 
references to the République form the framework of Gentili’s De iure belli, from the first to the 
last page of the long treatise’ and ‘Gentili draws on Bodin’s masterpiece not only for his 
absolutistic scheme of supreme power, but also for many arguments and formulae already 
proposed by the French jurist’.38 Bodin’s doctrine, Quaglioni continues, ‘seems to be the first 
and major source of Gentili’s De iure belli’.39 This may be somewhat of an overstatement; 
indeed, in addition to the fact that there are numerous authors cited many more times than Bodin 
in DIB, Peter Schröder reminds us that given the abundance of sources cited by Gentili, and his 
reliance—shared by his contemporaries, particularly the humanists—on a complex ‘web of 
authors’, it is somewhat risky to single out one author as the leading authority in the context of 
DIB, including Bodin himself on the discussion of sovereignty.40  That being said, and while 
Gentili does not always agree with Bodin when he cites him, the extent to which sections of DIB 
read as direct discussions of Bodin’s arguments is indeed striking.  
Quaglioni provides numerous examples of Gentili’s discussion of Bodin in the text of De 
iure belli, along with a helpful analysis of what argument Gentili is making in each case, whether 
he is in agreement with Bodin or demarcating himself from him. I will not repeat this discussion 
here, but to give an idea of the breadth of topics on which Gentili cites Bodin—either 
																																																						
37 Wijffels, ‘From Perugia to Oxford’ 2008 (n. 11).  
38 Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 2013 (n. 22), 376. See also Quaglioni, ‘Pour une histoire du droit de 
guerre au début de l’âge moderne. Bodin, Gentili, Grotius’ 2010 (n. 22), 38. ‘Le Bodin de la République est le point 
de départ et la principale référence de la doctrine gentilienne’. 
39 Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 2013 (n. 22), 378. 
40 Schröder, ‘Vitoria, Gentili, Bodin: Sovereignty and the Law of Nations’ 2010 (n. 22), 170. 
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approvingly or disapprovingly as a springboard for his own argument—these include the 
relationship with exiles, war in the defense of religion, the theory of self-preservation, preventive 
self-defense, defensive treaties, sureties given to enemies, hostages, expenses, damages from 
war, and slavery.41 In other words, throughout DIB, Gentili is extensively engaging with Bodin 
(République, overwhelmingly). He is not merely citing him in passing as a source of support or 
acknowledging him equally fleetingly as the exponent of a conflicting view, but actively 
dissecting Bodin’s arguments and building up his own vis-à-vis those of the famous French 
jurist.   
In addition, Bodin is cited at key moments in DIB—including within the first two pages 
of Gentili’s treatise—which does support the idea that Gentili was drawing on Bodin in framing 
his arguments. And indeed, Alain Wijffels notes that the Gentili’s manuscripts, held in the 
Bodleian’s D’Orville collection, make clear that Gentili read République cover to cover while he 
was carrying out the preparatory work for DIB.42 Gentili’s twenty pages of annotations on 
République closely follow the order of the six books, and the most often encountered annotation 
in the margins—the capital letter ‘B’—is believed to stand for ‘bellum’ and thus to indicate the 
passages used in DIB.43 Thus, it is clear at the very least that Gentili had read the République 
very attentively, and that he profoundly admired Bodin’s work, even if on certain points, such as 
the question of slavery, he occasionally did find Bodin ‘exceedingly silly’.44 All in all, what 
comes across from Gentili’s engagement with Bodin in DIB is, on the one hand, a constant back 
and forth between agreeing and disagreeing with Bodin on various specific issues, and, on the 
other hand, a broad acceptance of Bodin’s wider principles, both in substance and in method.  
																																																						
41 An in depth discussion of some of these examples can be found in Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 
2013 (n. 22), 376–382. 
42 Wijffels, ‘From Perugia to Oxford’ 2008 (n. 11), 68-9.  
43 Ibid, 69.   
44 DIB, Book I, Chapter 9, §541.  
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There are two core elements of Bodin’s République that appear to have had a particularly 
important impact on the way Gentili framed his theory of the laws of war. First, Gentili draws 
heavily on Bodin in his method, praising his critique of modern commentators who seek to 
derive military law from Roman law alone. More specifically, Gentili ‘appreciated Bodin’s 
attempt to put in order and, so to speak, systematize the late-medieval tradition of ius gentium 
into a new comparative legal-historical doctrine’.45 Like Bodin, Gentili was quite sympathetic to 
the criticisms of conventional approaches to Roman law waged by the French legal humanists, 
and he drew extensively from Bodin’s methodology in developing his legal framework in DIB. 
While unlike Bodin, Gentili saw Roman law as timeless and thus directly applicable to all the 
problems of his day,46 he stepped away from the Bartolists’ traditional uncritical and 
unconditional reliance on medieval authorities to analyze the Corpus iuris and drew instead on 
an extensive web of sources, notably giving pride of place to historians—both modern and 
classical—in his analysis. Bodin himself had broken off from the conventional mos gallicus and 
drawn extensively from both the legal humanists and the Bartolists in his attempt to elaborate a 
new legal system, an eclectic approach that must have appealed to Gentili. Gentili’s discussion of 
Bodin on this point—which, as we shall see, also includes a critical dimension—appears at the 
very start of De iure belli, in the fourth paragraph of the first chapter, and clearly serves an 
important framing function for the work as a whole.      
Second, Gentili quite clearly appears to be striving for a way to reconcile Bodin’s 
absolutist conception of sovereignty with traditional understandings of the just war. As 
Quaglioni puts it, Gentili ‘did not ignore the ambiguity of Bodin’s concept of just war, the 
																																																						
45 Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 2013 (n. 22), 383.  
46 This is particularly striking when Gentili defends the application of Roman law to constitutional issues of his day, 
as discussed in Straumann, ‘The Corpus Iuris as a Source of Law Between Sovereigns in Alberico Gentili’s 
Thought’ (n. 37), 106–8.  
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difficulty of finding in it a clear definition, and especially the problem of adapting it to Bodin’s 
concept of supreme power (summa potestas)’.47 It is true that Bodin had in fact written ‘a 
complex elaboration on the concept of just war and more generally of an international law 
doctrine for it’48 in République, Book VI, chapters 5 and 6. However, it is not clear whether or 
not Gentili was actually aware of it, as he only cites the Latin text in DIB and therefore may 
never have read the French edition which Bodin expanded between 1576 and 1583.49 In any 
case, it is obvious from Book I, Chapter 3, entitled ‘War is Waged by Sovereigns’ that Gentili’s 
considerations on war were driven by the question of how to reconcile supreme authority with 
ideas about the just war, and one detects in his work a palpable sense of urgency fostered by the 
intractable wars that were decimating Europe at the time.  
Although he does not explicitly cite Bodin in the chapter, the fact that he is indebted to 
the Frenchman for his conceptualization of sovereignty is hard to miss, and it is unsurprising to 
note how heavily—and this time, explicitly—Gentili came to rely on Bodin’s ideas in his 
seminal defense of absolutism, De potestate regis absoluta a few years later. Bodin defined 
sovereignty according to the four following principles: it had to be supreme (no superior except 
for God), absolute (the sovereign cannot be tried, unless he explicitly consents to it), indivisible 
(it is metaphorically held in only one set of hands, such as the King or Parliament—but not 
both), and perpetual (it cannot be changing hands).50 The sovereign had a specific set of 
prerogatives held by them alone, most importantly the right to make laws, the ‘one attribute 
above all others’, which ‘included the privilege of declaring war and concluding peace, as well 
																																																						
47 Ibid. See also Quaglioni, ‘Il "Machiavellismo" Di Jean Bodin (‘ République’, V, 5-6)’, Il Pensiero Politico 22:2 
(1989), 198-207. 
48 Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 2010 (n. 22), 383.  
49 Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 2010 (n. 22), 383.  
50  This definition of maiestas or summum imperium can be found in Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la République, 
Corpus des œuvres de philosophie en langue française (Paris: Fayard, 1986), Book I., viii. For a brief analysis, see 
Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner, Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), 2.  
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as the right of selecting the highest magistrates in the state.51 Echoing these ideas very closely, 
Gentili begins the chapter by stating that sovereigns are ‘supreme’, that they ‘acknowledge no 
judge or superior’, and that ‘they alone merit the title of public, while all others are inferior and 
are rated as private individuals’.52 ‘The sovereign’, he continues, ‘has no earthly judge, for one 
over whom another holds a superior position is not a sovereign’.53 The central idea of the 
chapter, that only sovereigns can make war, also closely follows Bodin’s ideas, particularly as 
private wars and mixed wars (public/private) were still a dominant feature of the age. Gentili 
repeats and expands on the latter theme in Book I, Chapter 10 (‘On the Compacts of Leaders’), 
emphasizing that sovereigns ‘alone can make agreements binding on the state’, that the sovereign 
‘alone can make war, therefore he alone can end it’, and ‘just so it is said that only the sovereign 
can give a safe-conduct, since he alone can suspend sentence and give immunity from the 
consequences of a crime’.54 
There are, it is important to note, a few elements in the DIB that seem less aligned with 
Bodin’s ideas. This raises two interrelated questions: first, how should these elements be 
understood within Gentili’s broader framework? In other words, why might these passages be 
included in light of their apparent incompatibility with the rest of Gentili’s approach? Second, 
may this suggest that five years before the publication of the incontestably absolutist and 
Bodinian Regales disputationes tres, Gentili was in fact, and despite relying on Bodin very 
extensively, not an absolutist yet? As I have mentioned, the debate over the extent of Gentili’s 
absolutism has been tainted by political motives, with Gentili’s opponents pointing to his 
absolutist leanings as a way to undermine his broader reputation, particularly during his revival 
																																																						
51 Ibid., 3.  
52 DIB, Book I, Chapter 3, §23.  
53 Ibid.  
54 DIB, Book I, Chapter 10, §288.  
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in the late nineteenth century when the accounts of his ‘greatness’ as an international jurist were 
systematically elaborated. Since it is now well-established that Gentili made his absolutism 
eminently clear in the Regales disputations tres, I will address the main elements in DIB that 
may suggest he held a different position a few years earlier and argue that these should be 
understood primarily as exceptions made in light of the surrounding political context and of 
Gentili’s personal obligations.    
First, it is true that, as Van der Molen notes, on certain points, Gentili’s absolutism is not 
as stark in DIB as it is in the Regales disputationes tres.55 Yet, the caveats to sovereign authority 
that Gentili introduces are hardly incompatible with an absolutist position. For example, Gentili 
puts forward certain limitations to absolute sovereign power within very specific cases, notably 
in his discussion of the rather extreme situations where a sovereign would alienate her subjects 
(i.e. make them subjects of another sovereign) or abandon them altogether.56 While this does 
suggest some limitation to sovereign power, Gentili makes it very clear that these limitations are 
minimal and mainly intended to avoid tyranny: ‘Imagine that the emperor has the freest possible 
power; yet it is not for purposes of tyranny, but of administration.’57 The distinction between an 
all-powerful king and a tyrant was actually quite common, including in Bodin’s writing, and 
Bodin himself considered tyrannicide allowable (something which Van der Molen finds 
‘strange’58). And in fact, while Van der Molen highlights the existence of restrictions to the 
rights of the sovereign found in DIB ‘in spite of no fewer than thirty-five references to Bodin’s 
																																																						
55 Van der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law 1968 (n. 29), 227-230.  
56 DIB, Book I, Chapter 23, §185. 
57 DIB, Book III, Chapter 15, §610. 
58 Van der Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law (n. 29), 227. 
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“De Republica,”’ it is worth noting that Bodin himself introduced a number of such restrictions 
in his masterpiece.59  
Second, at the end of his crucial chapter, ‘War is Waged by Sovereigns’, Gentili does 
raise some difficult questions and introduces some additional caveats in his conceptualization of 
sovereignty, this time with direct references to his geopolitical environment. Most notably, he 
makes some pragmatic concessions regarding the status of “states such as Venice,” which he 
considers to “have the same power as any supreme sovereign’.60 However, this is not entirely 
surprising, as Bodin’s definition of sovereignty raised some extremely difficult questions for the 
established order in most countries, including France which had long had a mixed constitution, 
and most importantly for the Holy Roman Empire. Following the publication of the République, 
there was an almost panic-stricken debate amongst German jurists about how to reconcile 
Bodin’s ideas with the realities of the feudal empire, which would last for over thirty years.61 
Gentili, who by definition had to engage with the existence of different forms of polities on the 
international stage in devising his system of laws, was left in a similarly uncomfortable position 
by Bodin’s arguments, and to some extent he tried to make some space for a slightly looser 
definition of sovereignty in the context of the right to wage war.  
Finally, the section most at odds with Gentili’s broader absolutist leanings in DIB can be 
found in his chapter entitled ‘Defending the Subjects of Another Against Their Sovereigns,’62 
which would have been directly relevant to the question of whether it was legal for the English to 
support Dutch subjects in their rebellion against the Spanish. This seems to be the only passage 
																																																						
59 Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory (n. 31), Chapter 5. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Julian H. Franklin, ‘Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution: Bodin and His Critics (1991)’, in The Cambridge 
History of Political Thought 1450–1700, by J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 309–328.  
62 DIB, Book III, Chapter 16.  
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in the text in which Gentili appears to be going in a completely different direction, contradicting 
himself on nearly everything else he has put forward in DIB regarding the nature of sovereignty, 
the right to war, and the legitimacy of rebellion. In addition to legitimizing the English 
intervention in favor of the Dutch, he makes a U-turn on his exclusion of ‘those who have 
revolted’ from the protection of laws of war63, as well as on his broader, crushing indictment of 
rebels,64 and suggests that the Dutch may in fact be entitled to rebel against the Spanish, because 
they have acquired enough power to ‘share as it were in the sovereignty’. ‘They are’, he 
continues, ‘public characters and on an equality with the sovereign, just as one sovereign is said 
to be on an equality with another when he is able to resist the other in an offer of violence.’65  
If anything, what this chapter does is illustrate the extent to which Gentili’s new 
framework for the laws of war put him in an awkward position vis-à-vis his own allegiances. 
Due to his circumstances, as a Protestant exile in England with close ties to the Court, it was 
unthinkable for Gentili not to support the Dutch Revolt in DIB, even if this meant contradicting 
himself quite extensively. Ultimately, this chapter is fascinating because its content was so 
directly relevant to the main conflict of Gentili’s time, and it neatly illustrates the tension 
between the framework Gentili was trying to develop and the political realities he had to 
personally navigate. It is hard to see how Gentili could have argued anything else on this 
particular topic. Obviously, claiming that in rebelling against the Spanish the Dutch were 
violators of the law of nations was simply not an option. Gentili therefore had to perform an 
incongruous intellectual pirouette and quietly contradict himself for the sake of political 
bienséance.   
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Gentili can thus evidently be understood as already having been an absolutist in DIB, 
with his reliance on Bodin further deepening in the following years. However, in light of 
Gentili’s difficulty in adapting some of Bodin’s ideas to the geopolitical configurations of his 
time, it is clear that there were some limits to how far Gentili could rely on the République to 
develop his arguments for DIB, particularly in the sense that DIB was specifically geared 
towards regulating relations between sovereign states. Bodin’s ‘great concern, like that of the 
whole group of “politique” jurists, was civil war and the good and unity of France’.66 As a result, 
these thinkers ‘had little to say about any law applicable in France’s external relations beyond 
what was said by Bodin about there being absolutely no real universal empire and that only a 
kind of ius fetiale regulated the relations between sovereigns’.67 Yet, these external relations 
were precisely what Gentili was concerned with. In fact, Bodin’s chapter in the République on 
the ancient ius fetiale (and on treaties and peace)68 is ‘one of the most extensively annotated 
chapters in Gentili’s manuscript notes, and, correspondingly, one of the most frequently quoted 
chapter from Bodin’s book in Gentili’s De iure belli’.69 In other words, Bodin’s ideas were of 
great appeal to Gentili, who attempted to draw on as much of Bodin’s work as he could in light 
of his own interests, but there were clearly some areas that were central to Gentili’s endeavor 
which Bodin had not covered sufficiently. 
Most importantly, Bodin’s ideas on sovereignty had significant implications for inter-
state relations, and raised one particularly delicate issue. His all-important concept of the 
Commonwealth [République], the entity to which his concept of indivisible and absolute 
sovereignty was to apply, was the central element of his plan for restoring order. Within each 
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Commonwealth, a single sovereign authority would have the power to arbitrate disputes and 
establish final rules, thus providing a way out of otherwise intractable confessional strife. At a 
time where constitutional arrangements had been the norm in France, with the King expected to 
respect the rules of consent and work with institutions such as the General Estates and the 
Parlement of Paris, Bodin’s defense of indivisible and absolute sovereignty was a bold 
conceptual move, bolder than even he ever seemed to realize.70 Bodin’s concept of the 
Commonwealth stood as a powerful tool for re-establishing order and stability within France and 
other similar kingdoms. However, it raised a problem at a higher level. If each Commonwealth 
was characterized by indivisible sovereignty, and if each prince was thus the highest authority 
deciding upon all matters of the land, then how would one settle disagreements amongst 
Commonwealths? This was a critical question at a time when, following the Reformation and the 
collapse of the religiously united Latin West, the emerging sovereign state had all of the sudden 
achieved external sovereignty,71 and as with the question of how to define sovereignty within the 
Holy Roman Empire, Bodin appears to have launched a seminal debate which he himself was not 
necessarily interested in. The issue of settling disagreements amongst Commonwealths is the 
main problématique underpinning DIB, and Gentili found little by means of an answer in 
Bodin’s work.  
Importantly, this question arose within a broader move towards the emancipation of the 
laws of war from the law at large and the gradual emergence of the ius belli as a new discipline.72 
By the second half of the sixteenth century, ‘the genre of self-standing treatises [on the laws of 
war] imposed its own rules’, which meant that authors could ‘isolate the relevant texts from the 
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glossators, commentators, and humanist jurists on the laws of war and military discipline from 
the rest’, leaving out ‘direct references to rules of private law from the Justinian and canon 
collections and the glosses thereon’.73 This is clear in the works of the two most famous 
sixteenth century jurists of war (prior to DIB)—Pierino Belli (1505-1575) and Balthazar Ayala 
(1548-1584), both Roman law specialists and military judges—who took important steps in that 
direction. Gentili, however, took ‘a second important step’74 in also emancipating his treatise on 
the laws of war from non-legal considerations of the rules of military discipline. As such, DIB 
constituted the first treatise solely concerned with ‘the laws regulating warfare between 
independent bodies politic’, marking a significant turning point in ‘the emergence of the ius belli 
as the hardcore of a future “ius inter gentes”’,75 a law between independent, sovereign peoples.  
In sum, while Bodin and the politiques were concerned with how best to ensure order in 
France, Gentili was actively trying to cope with the consequences of Bodin’s conceptual move 
for the international plane, and to develop a standalone set of rules for managing the conflicts 
that would inevitably arise between independent and absolutely sovereign polities.76 Thus, while 
it is true that ‘what is evident from the outset of [DIB] is that [Gentili] departs—despite his 
admiration for Baldus and the Corpus iuris civilis—towards an innovative discussion of inter-
state relations, which is clearly informed by the use of Bodin’s République’,77 Bodin cannot have 
been Gentili’s sole (or even main) source of inspiration for his considerations on inter-state 
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relations. For this, he turned to reason of state writers who, by contrast with Bodin, had written 
extensively about the international. 
 
III. Thinking the international: the influence of the ragion di stato tradition  
The most famous treatise on raison d’état, Botero’s Della Ragion di Stato was published just 
three years (1586) before Gentili’s lectures on the laws of war, and Gentili was clearly 
influenced by this intellectual courant, particularly in DIB. Indeed, one of the most striking 
influences on Gentili in DIB is Guicciardini, whom he cites no less than sixty-three times, nearly 
twice as many times as Bodin (although the latter tends to be discussed more directly in the text). 
This extensive reliance on the Florentine author denotes Gentili’s admiration, indirectly, for 
Machiavellian policies. The fact that Gentili relies much less on Machiavelli—whom he does 
cite but only on three occasions, and referring neither to the Prince nor to the Discorsi—may 
well be a result of the stigma that was associated with Guicciardini’s friend, and would be very 
much in line with the attitude adopted by later reason of state writers. As Burke explains, one of 
the primary problems for these writers was that while they strongly disliked Machiavelli—he 
was seen as the master of the devil’s reason of state—they could not do without his ideas.78 
Guicciardini, who put forth a set of considerations similar to those of his Florentine friend, was a 
much more palatable authority to cite. Similarly, in DIB Gentili makes over fifty citations of the 
Roman historian Tacitus, whose revival was deeply intertwined with the development of the 
ragion di stato literature, and who is sometimes said to have been a direct cover for references to 
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Machiavelli.79 Another possible explanation is that while Machiavelli was nearly obsessed with 
the Romans, Guicciardini drew much more on the contemporary world, particularly Florentine 
history, something which must have appealed greatly to Gentili, whom as we have seen relied on 
contemporary historians to an uncommon degree. In any case, beyond these mere numbers in 
terms of citation, it is quite obvious that Gentili thought about the ragion di stato writers—and 
particularly of Guicciardini—very highly. In fact, Gentili explicitly writes that Guicciardini is 
‘not merely a great historian and a political philosopher, but a great jurist as well’.80   
It is true that Gentili only cites Guicciardini’s Storia d’Italia (History of Italy); there is no 
mention of his Ricordi politici e civili, his collection of maxims on political, social, and religious 
topics. However, it is clear that Gentili heavily draws on Guicciardini’s work for its matter-of-
fact understanding of politics so central to the reason of state tradition, more so than as a source 
of purely illustrative historical anecdotes. For instance, he cites him to support the claim that 
sovereigns often cloak their dishonesty in religion,81 to explain the rejection of Luther’s doctrines 
(they are ‘unfavourable to the power of princes’),82 to praise the policies of Lorenzo de Medici, 
‘that wise man, friend of peace, and father of peace’ who ensured ‘that the balance of power 
should be maintained amongst the princes of Italy’,83 to suggest that princes will only come to 
the rescue of oppressed people if they are ‘led by a desire for personal gain’,84 to point out—
rather irreverently—that it is ‘characteristic of pontiffs not to keep their promises’ and that it is 
‘an established custom for the Church, regardless of contracts, promises, or receipt of favours, to 
renounce its obligations and even directly to oppose what the prelates had solemnly agreed 
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upon’,85 and the list goes on. On at least one occasion, a remark Gentili makes based on 
Guicciardini’s historical writings virtually sounds like one of the latter’s maxims: ‘it is a grave 
error to consider what ought to be done, not what a man will do who has the power to act’.86 In 
fact, when he elaborates this point and explains that ‘every pledge is capable of being broken’, he 
cites Tacitus approvingly, claiming that ‘the statement of Tacitus is always true, that enduring 
faith never exists between victors and vanquished’.87 What is more, Gentili seems to disagree 
explicitly with Guicciardini on just one occasion, on the question of whether Kings should ‘fight 
in single combat for the dominion to which both sides laid claim’,88 a rather minor details in light 
of the extent to which Gentili draws on Guicciardini otherwise.   
What, then, were the main insights of this reason of state tradition so extensively drawn 
on by Gentili? The remainder of this section lays out the core features of the reason of state 
literature, outlining the context in which it emerged, the basic tenets of the new strand of thought 
it ushered in, and the sources it turned to—particularly Tacitus, another key influence on 
Gentili’s DIB. Most importantly, the reason of state writers developed a set of principles that 
could be applied not just domestically, but also—and explicitly—to relations between 
sovereigns. As I have briefly indicated earlier, there is no doubt that, for his part, Gentili was 
deeply concerned by the regulation of inter-sovereign relations and the specific problem of how 
to resolve conflicts between sovereigns, whom he saw as recognizing no superiors by 
definition.89 During his eventual revival, he would in fact come to be celebrated notably for his 
remarkable advocacy of international arbitration, which he portrayed as an alternative to war, 
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‘the arbitrament of Mars.’90 It is thus not entirely surprising that in light of the limitations of 
Bodin’s rather inward-looking text, Gentili turned to those writers who seemed most explicitly 
interested in addressing the issues raised by inter-sovereign relations. 
At its core, the rise of reason of state thinking marked a transition from the Renaissance 
concept of politics as ‘the art of ruling a republic according to justice and reason’ (paraphrasing 
Latini’s famous definition of 1266) to a new understanding of politics as the means of preserving 
a state, or in other words, politics as the knowledge of the means of preserving domination over a 
people (paraphrasing Botero’s equally famous formulation of 1586).91 The Renaissance concept 
of politics, sometimes also couched as the art of good government, had flourished in the age of 
Civic Humanism; its principles were rooted in traditions of political virtue, civil law and 
Aristotelianism,92 and the model it sought to follow was that of the Roman republic, as described 
by Cicero and Livy. Machiavelli and Guicciardini, although they were both symptomatic of a 
transitional epoch and in many ways remained anchored in the tradition of politics as the art of 
the republic, took some important steps in a different direction, which Guicciardini would, in the 
1520s first term ‘reason of state’. Their key contribution was to carve out a new space of 
morality, one that applied distinctly to the prince’s task of ‘maintaining the state’ (mantenere lo 
stato) and which could entail using certain means that would otherwise have been condemned as 
immoral.  
Two elements are particularly important here. First, they argued that the prince should 
readily use force when in the interest of the state; second, they placed prudence—rather than 
justice—as the heart of their system of princely virtues. In other words, although much of their 
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approach was still grounded in the Florentine republican tradition, they put forward a 
revolutionary analysis of what should count as virtuous behavior for a prince, discarding the 
traditional approach based on personal virtue. They made, in modern terms, ‘a virtue of 
necessity’, and they broke down the classical divide between violence and virtue, arguing—most 
famously in the case of Machiavelli—that because of the circumstances of reality, it was 
sometimes necessary to act in beastly ways, like the fox and the lion (turning Cicero’s classic 
quote on its head, that ‘[w]hile wrong may be done, then, in either of two ways, that is, by force 
or by fraud, both are bestial: fraud seems to belong to the cunning fox, force to the lion; both are 
wholly unworthy of man…’93). Ultimately, these writers were advocates of pragmatic 
compromises and the use of sometimes ruthless methods to ensure the well-being of the state; as 
explained by Guicciardini, one simply could not govern a state according to conscience’.94  
In developing these ideas, Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and their contemporaries were 
responding to the challenges of their time. After years of flourishing republican government, 
Florence was torn between its republican antecedents and the rule of the Medici, changing 
governments four times between 1494 and 1530. In light of the atmosphere of considerable 
political instability—and not unlike the French politiques a few decades later—these writers 
became increasingly concerned with how to avoid, above all, the collapse of the state. In his 
quest for answers, Guicciardini, in particular, turned not to Livy and Cicero, who had written 
during the heydays of the Roman republic, but to Tacitus, whose Annals, in particular, pertained 
to the unstable transitionary period between the republic and the empire in the aftermath of 
Caesar’s assassination in 44 BCE. Guicciardini’s turn to this other classical historian was central 
to his ideology and eventually became widely popularized by Justus Lipsius, whose inauguration 
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lecture at the university of Jena is ‘one of the most dynamic applications of Tacitus to politics in 
the Renaissance’.95 Although this particular lecture was not published until 1607, Lipsius (who is 
cited thirteen times in DIB) generally became the greatest Tacitus scholar and advocate of the 
crucial contemporary relevance of his work—seeing Livy’s writings as ‘sweet nothingness’ in 
comparison96—and inspired an entire generation of thinkers to investigate Tacitus’ writings. 
Lipsius’ new edition of Tacitus’s works in 1574 became the first of a very long series of 
reeditions, a testimony to an explosion of interest in the thought of the Roman historian. The key 
turning point, however, was again with Bodin, who criticized Machiavelli, More, Patrizi, and 
others for now having drawn sufficiently on Tacitus, and who, in his case for monarchy as the 
most excellent form of government, argued that Tacitus was ‘the most useful ancient historian 
for illustrating the principles upon which monarchies operate’.97 His reevaluation of Tacitus as 
the go-to historian for political instruction on how to run a monarchical government was 
‘enlarged and refined by others’ and this process was key to the eventual development of the 
reason of state tradition of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.98 Thus, although much 
can be written about the differences between these individuals and their respective works, the 
names of Tacitus, Machiavelli, and Guicciardini became intertwined and perceived as the 
ideological basis of the ‘reason of state’ movement.  
The practices put forth by Machiavelli were hugely controversial, and he and Tacitus—
now couched as a classical precursor to the Florentine writer—came to be seen as advocates of a 
‘bad’ reason of state, irreconcilable with Christian principles by the late sixteenth century. This 
was made especially clear from the late sixteenth century in the work of Botero and his 
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contemporaries, and the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ reason of state became a classical 
trope of early seventeenth century thinking.99 The challenge, ultimately, for writers such as 
Botero, was to reconcile the insights of Machiavelli—which were extremely perceptive and 
uncontestably valuable—with a more palatable normative framework. As Comparato explains, 
‘behind the façade of deference and virtue which [late sixteenth century] writers presented, 
contemporary politics continued to reflect Guicciardini’s maxim that “one cannot keep a state 
according to conscience”’.100 Crucially, in their attempt to respond to the unstable political 
atmosphere of their time, political thinkers continued to draw extensively on the analyses of 
historians such as Tacitus; not only did history provide princes with the ‘experience’ so central to 
the exercise of prudence,101 but the work of historians, stripped of illusions, appeared far more 
useful than the preaching of moralists.102 One of their key concerns in searching these historical 
texts for advice was how to navigate what had become an explosive network of external relations 
between sovereigns. Lipsius had famously compared the Duke of Alba to Tiberius, the Roman 
emperor described as a notorious tyrant by Tacitus, and indeed, the conflict between Spain, 
England, and the Low Countries was squarely on the mind of both legal and political thinkers at 
the time.       
Raison d’état writers thus had a keen interest in the question of how best to conduct 
external relations, a fact that did not escape Gentili in his own attempt to grapple with the issue 
of inter-sovereign relations. This shared interest was not surprising in light of the developments 
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of the period: as the theoretical foundations of absolutism and reason of state in internal affairs 
became ‘sufficiently comprehensive to provide ready-made justifications for the many 
measures… believed to be required by political necessity’,103 foreign policy became an even 
more pressing topic. This is not to say that full internal sovereignty was achieved before or faster 
than external sovereignty. If anything, the process went the other way around, with sovereigns 
suddenly achieving external sovereignty after the collapse of the unity of the Latin West, while 
internally, struggles for power continued well into the eighteenth and even the nineteenth 
century.104 The point here is that in terms of legal rules, the basis for how the state would operate 
internally under an absolute sovereign was fairly clear, while by contrast, foreign policy ‘was 
subject to no generally recognized principles, legal or moral’,105 and thus required the 
development of some clear guidance for sovereigns. 
In the broadest sense, raison d’état writers ‘held it self-evident that the same principles 
and techniques that would ensure the strength of the prince’s rule inside his realm would also be 
applicable in his external relations’.106 Prudence, necessity, and the interests of the state were 
systematically at the heart of their recommendations. This meant that, for instance, they 
considered the use of frauds and ruses to be perfectly acceptable in the conduct of external 
relations, although they did try to establish some rules of decency in the use of such stratagems 
in an effort to demarcate themselves from the notoriously more permissive Machiavelli. It was 
possible, Justus Lipsius argued, for virtue to remain intact if prudence was mixed with trickery 
with a good end. Lipsius then developed this ‘Procrustean doctrine’ in greater detail; he 
distinguished between light, medium, and great ruses and fraud, of which he only allowed the 
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first two. Light ruses and frauds, generally to be blamed on the victim rather than the author, ‘did 
not depart seriously from virtue and included deceit and dissimulation’; medium ruses and 
frauds, which included ‘the corruption of another ruler’s emissaries and agents, the sending of 
spies abroad, and the spreading of information’ were ‘mid-way between virtue and open vice’; 
and finally, great ruses and frauds, such as ‘the willful breaking of treaties and other sworn 
agreements, and injustice contrary to the highest legal and moral principles’, were considered to 
break ‘entirely with virtue and law, resulting in perfidy and injustice’.107  
Gentili could find plenty to draw on from reading these writers who, unlike Bodin, 
directly addressed the realm of the international. However, while the limits they posited involved 
a certain respect for legal agreements, notably treaties, as a whole, reason of state writers had 
little consideration for the role of the law of nations in regulating relations between states. Their 
language was not that of law, but that of political necessity, state interest, and, especially from 
the 1590s, balance of power.108 In fact, the growing influence of their ideas in the seventeenth 
century—the development of what may be called ‘baroque statecraft’—went hand in hand with 
the demise of lawyers as influential figures in the conduct of politics, and particularly the 
conduct of external relations.109 For a jurist like Gentili, this was bound to raise some issues. 
While he did deeply admire the reason of state tradition, one decisive factor made him stand out 
sharply from this group: unlike them, he saw law as a crucial ingredient for external relations.110 
In the final section, I will thus argue that DIB must be understood as a text that tries to adapt not 
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only Bodinian absolutism but also—and crucially— the insights of the reason of state writers to 
a system of laws for regulating interactions between independent sovereigns.   
 
IV. Between law and politics  
In attempting to bridge the jus gentium and the reason of state tradition, Gentili was part of a 
long trend of trying to link political and legal thought together. In practice, lawyers had often 
been prominent figures in government, particularly in the critical context of Renaissance Italy.111 
In other words, they were deeply involved in statecraft, and their professional work as lawyers 
often overlapped quite extensively with their careers as government officials. More broadly, 
prior to the development of the ragion di stato literature, the rule of law culture had been 
essential in ‘the political governance of the late-medieval Italian polities where the law scholars 
and consultants of the mos italicus had thrived’.112 The result of this close overlap between law 
and politics was a significant effort on the part of lawyers to engage with questions of politics, 
and they did so specifically by turning to history. Although this turn to history would become 
most apparent—and most systematic—in the works of Baudouin and Bodin113 in the second half 
of the sixteenth century, this inter-disciplinary engagement had a long pedigree, with Bartolus 
being one of the first legal thinkers to write not simply as a lawyer but also as a historian.  
As mentioned earlier, Bodin’s work marked a turning point in that Bodin tried to base his 
construction of a new system of law on universal history. Bodin’s turn to history was very much 
in line with what Machiavelli had attempted earlier in the century (and indeed, Bodin praises 
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Machiavelli’s method on this front in the Methodus), and this overlap is very much connected to 
these thinkers’ focus on the prince as the sovereign. Since the focus, both for Machiavelli in The 
Prince and for Bodin in his advocacy of absolutism, was on the person of the supreme sovereign, 
they found it essential to unearth the history of former princes and assess the actions they had 
taken. As suggested earlier, history was, after all, a treasure trove of ‘experience’ that would help 
princes (and their advisers) determine how best to act prudently.114 Yet, while Bodin and 
Machiavelli have often been juxtaposed as founders of a modern discipline of political 
science,115 Bodin’s emphasis on legal thought meant that in terms of method the two writers 
were ‘literally worlds apart’.116 Bodin, by virtue of his training and intellectual affinities—
‘worked in a much richer—and more inhibiting—context of legal, historical, and philosophical 
erudition’ than Machiavelli, and he was ‘unable to separate politics from its legal and social 
environment’.117 In this respect, Kelley points to the insightful remark of one of ‘Bodin’s most 
perceptive commentators’, Moireau-Reibel: ‘the Republic is the work not so much of a great 
politique as of a great legist, the work of a successor not of Machiavelli but of Beaumanoir and 
Bartolus’.118 In other words, what jurists such as Bodin and his followers were doing was distinct 
from the reason of state writers in that they considered law to be at the center of their intellectual 
endeavor and placed it in direct dialogue with politics and history.    
Gentili, deeply influenced as he was by Bodin, was very much a follower of this 
approach, and notwithstanding his admiration for the reason of state writers, he made a sustained 
effort to ‘assert the authority of the law of nations’ which he was contributing to ‘formulate as a 
																																																						
114 Comparato and Quaglioni, ‘From Machiavellism to the End of the Seventeenth Century’ 2007 (n. 108), 82. 
115 It is worth mentioning that Bodin had rather mixed opinions about Machiavelli. While he praised him for his 
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distinct and autonomous legal discipline’.119 This attempt to reconcile the two approaches, 
particularly once combined with the initial tensions raised by the application of Bodinian 
absolutism to a jus gentium framework, put Gentili in a slightly difficult position here. On the 
one hand, he was a key advocate of absolutism, and in justifying his position, he had made much 
of the medieval distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary powers of the prince in a 
domestic context, thus limiting the constraints imposed on the prince by public law to the realm 
of ordinary power.120 In other words, in the domestic context Gentili had tried to free the 
sovereign from the constraints of the law by expanding the scope of the prince’s extraordinary 
powers and thus the primacy of the prince’s discretion over the rule of law. In practice, 
sovereigns were indeed gradually shifting towards more absolutist forms of rule, and what had 
been ‘extraordinary’ powers in the Middle Ages were now increasingly become part of the 
‘ordinary’ category. On the other hand, the autonomy of the law of nations which Gentili was 
seeking to establish in DIB121 risked being strongly undermined by the rise of supreme 
sovereigns acting as the sole legitimate actors internationally and actively pursuing the interest of 
their polity according to the principles of reason of state. It was thus key for Gentili to find a way 
to maintain the early-modern sovereign within the late-medieval Italian culture of accepting the 
constraints of the law. Gentili thus turned to a variety of sources—from those of his Perugian 
heritage to the work of Bodin—in order to try and adjust to early modern sovereignty the law of 
nations as conceived in the mos italicus that had been so central to the government of late-
medieval Italian polities.122   
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As I have suggested earlier, by the time he wrote DIB, Gentili was not exactly a staunch 
follower of the mos italicus anymore and he may well have been following Bodin in cherry 
picking what he found most useful in both the Bartolist and the legal humanist traditions in his 
construction of a new legal framework.123 Bodin’s work, in addition to the justification it 
provided of absolutism as discussed in part II, was indeed crucially important to Gentili on two 
further counts here. First, his systematic approach had been hailed—in Protestant countries but 
also in Catholic ones despite the condemnation of his books by Roman Catholics—‘as a new 
model of scholarly teaching of public law’.124 Indeed, Bodin’s ‘hyper-rationalizing tendencies’125 
had led him to approach the law in a way that would prove enormously influential for later jurists 
interested in systematizing the law of nations. Second, his extensive considerations on 
sovereignty, his rigorous attempt to clarify what this concept meant in precise legal terms, and 
more broadly, his attempt to fuse the language about power and interests with the language of 
rights and authority126 provided an essential resource for Gentili in trying to adapt the insights of 
ragion di stato to his legal framework.  
   The specific challenge Gentili faced, however, was to reconcile the law of nations both 
with reason of state thinking and with his ringing endorsement of absolutism. It is with respect to 
the latter than Gentili and the theologians can be seen as explicitly political rivals, as the 
theologians’ natural law theories grew out of their anti-Machiavellian stance and became the 
																																																						
123 On Bodin’s turn to practice, his admiration for the Bartolism on which the practice of law relied, his move away 
from (or rather beyond) legal humanism, and his attempt to combine the best of both the mos gallicus and the mos 
italicus and overcome their respective (as well as overlapping) limitations, see Donald R. Kelley, ‘The Development 
and Context of Bodin’s Method’, Jean Bodin: Verhandlungen Der Internationalen Bodin-Tagung (Munich: CH 
Beck, 1973), 123–50.  
124 Quaglioni, ‘The Italian "Readers" of Bodin’ 2013 (n. 22), 372. 
125 Kelley, ‘The Development and Context of Bodin’s Method’ 1973 (n. 123), 144. 
126 Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory 1973 (n. 31).  
 43 
basis for their broader anti-absolutism.127 Indeed, they rejected ‘not only autocratic forms of 
government but absolute monarchy altogether’, leading to a lengthy controversy over what 
exactly natural and divine law ‘meant, enjoined, allowed, and restricted’.128 Gentili’s challenge 
on this point, then, was to find a way to reconcile natural law theories with his absolutist 
position, a rather difficult (if not seemingly contradictory) endeavor.129 Ultimately, Gentili’s DIB 
is thus peculiar in that it tries to bring together the implications of Bodin’s writings—both on 
absolutism and on the use of universal history as a way to ground a new system of law—and the 
remarkably insightful but also (particularly for a jurist) deeply challenging ideas of the raison 
d’état writers about relationships amongst independent polities into a framework for the laws of 
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